Still a LOT of problems with Ares... I am not so "optimistic" about this program. It will take off, no doubt about it, but NOT on the planned schedule. But then what is? LOL!
It is usual that there are challenges when designing a new system. The development of the Space Shuttle for example didn't look different to those challenges. But this time we have the internet and a lot of people watching NASA progresses and so it's like NASA administrator Michael Griffin mentioned a short while ago, that the so called problems just is something which exist in "certain internet blogs" which mostly contain misinformation and guesswork by people outside NASA and even outside the spaceflight business 
With respect, the above comment is entirely incorrect and requires addressing.
Mike Griffin's comment (which was aimed at the Orlando Sentinel about a year ago) was more out of frustration that every single news site has noted the vehicle has serious issues. And while I'm no fan of some of "blog sites" - given commentary about certain issues is open for mistranslation and misinterpretation - the news sites (non commentary media working from actual CxP documentation) are actually, one a whole, under-representing just how serious the issues with Ares I are in reality. You've just bunched all the sites into the "blog site" comment you made, which is quite frankly insulting.
As a news site, that has 173 CxP engineers on it, a site that is referenced by NASA even at 8th Floor level, and has 400gbs of CxP documentation on it via the non ITAR/Export Control Windchill supply line, I can assure you that the ACTUAL documentation is very clear on how this is more than "usual design challenges".
Moving past just the documentation and the potential of misrepresentation, the actual people working on this vehicle below upper management are crystal clear on these issues, their required mitigation, and the continued pressure on the DACs.
This is a vehicle that has caused so much pain on Orion via performance and mass properties, Orion had to undergo a ZBV process to strip down to removing certain aspects of flight critical redundancy, only adding it back on with the removal of the land landing option. 5.5m to 5m didn't work. Stripping 50 percent off the SM didn't work. ZBV had to work, but as a result caused Lockheed Martin to send DOCUMENTED notes of their frustration with the constant changes to their DACs - the latest causing an 18 month delay to Orion's PDR.
These issues are all being caused by Ares I - who's PDR started off by claiming TO was solved, before Jeff Hanley had to admit this wasn't the case, with a requirement for a Delta PDR next year. This is a vehicle with nine RED threats to its development, that they had to switch to "ORANGE" to get it through the recent PDR. (DOCUMENTED)
I'll give you an example of one of the ORANGE risk - one that's not even at the top of the list compared to TO mitigation etc:
Lift off Drift Curve. This has increased by 50 percent in just one DAC. This means the vehicle currently drifts into the top of the FSS during launch, which is a Loss Of Vehicle/Crew (LOVC) event (DOCUMENTED). To mitigate this requires a complete redesign of the billion dollar ML effort, scrapping the previous 16 months of development. (DOCUMENTED).
The comment "misinformation and guesswork by people outside NASA and even outside the spaceflight business" is non applicable to most news sites (forget blog sites), who base their news via the actual documentation and the actual engineers.
To claim otherwise is more applicable to your comment.
